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ABSTRACT
Research on interorganizational partnerships (IOPs) points to high levels of information-sharing, mediated by
interorganizational systems (IOS), as a determinant of value creation. However, it is widely acknowledged that such
interactions are characterized by opportunism, leading to transaction costs. Interfirm trust has been posited as one
mechanism for reducing transaction costs and promoting rich information sharing. In this research-in-progress, we seek to
understand the role of trust in facilitating information sharing in one form of IOS—electronic market access forums
(EMAFs). We draw on transaction cost economics (TCE) to suggest that the dominant trust-based mechanism in an EMAF
exchange is contingent upon the nature of information exchanged. This study will enhance understanding of how different
types of trust influence information sharing in IOPs, and, potentially, offer guidelines on how EMAF providers can improve
their margins by fostering different forms of trust-based governance.
Keywords
Interorganizational partnerships (IOPs), information sharing, trust, electronic market access forums (EMAFs)
INTRODUCTION

Recent research suggests that despite the efforts of buyers and suppliers to promote interorganizational information exchange,
such “interactions are plagued by opportunism and appropriability problems” (Arikan 2009, p.672). Consistent with theories
of relational governance, these authors suggest that “solutions to these problems lie in the development of trust and norms of
cooperation….” (p. 672) Relational governance literature proposes interorganizational trust as an alternative governance
mechanism that reduces transaction costs and improves relationship performance, while facilitating information exchange
(Dyer and Chu 2003; Ireland 2007; Zaheer 1995).
Reduced transaction costs and richer information exchange are promised by Internet-based interorganizational information
systems (IOS) in the form of electronic market access forums (EMAFs) (Commins and Trigg 2000). As enablers of
knowledge creation, EMAFs can generate greater profits through consulting and more advanced use of online tools - but, a
decade after the initiation of these types of enterprises, there is little evidence that buyers and suppliers perceive EMAFs as a
venue for strategic information exchange (Grieger 2003). Moreover, some authors suggest that confidentiality and
information security concerns may inhibit richer use of an EMAF, particularly since technologies exist to integrate
interorganizational processes without the need for an intermediary (Power 2007). This implies that trust mechanisms that
encourage transactional information exchange may differ from trust mechanisms that facilitate strategic information
exchange. Given that trust has been shown to be critical in situations where undesirable outcomes are possible (Luhmann
1979; Williamson 1985), we seek to understand the role of trust-based governance mechanisms in facilitating different
classes of information exchange in EMAF environments.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Transaction cost economics (TCE)

TCE provides a theoretical frame for examining interorganizational information flows. TCE proposes that “any transactional
exchange between two parties (e.g. buyers and suppliers) is characterized by opportunism, where one party can take
advantage of the other. The level of opportunism depends on the nature of the exchange environment…” (Grover et al. 2002,
p. 218). Concomitant with notions of opportunism is the assumption that organizations are boundedly rational—i.e. “limited
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in their ability to receive, store, retrieve, and communicate information without error”—making it difficult to specify all
contingencies surrounding an exchange (Grover et al. 2003, p. 459) . Together, opportunism and bounded rationality give
rise to transaction costs (Grover et al. 2003; Grover et al. 2002). Transaction costs are higher in the face of high uncertainty
and high asset specificity (Grover et al. 2003). Under these conditions, organizations are motivated to seek appropriate
governance mechanisms that will reduce transaction costs (Williamson 1975).
In the context of interorganizational partnerships (IOPs), an organization’s objectives for entering into an exchange
relationship may be incongruent with the objectives of potential exchange partners (Bowen and Jones 1986). This gives rise
to partnership uncertainty (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995) and uncertainty in the transactional environment (henceforth
called environment uncertainty) (Grover et al. 2002), particularly when parties involved have unequal access to information
surrounding an exchange (Bowen and Jones 1986; Choudhury et al. 1997). The higher the perceived level of uncertainty
surrounding the IOP environment and/or potential exchange partners, the higher the transaction costs, in terms of risk,
associated with sharing information.
Asset specificity, in the form of information specificity, refers to the extent to which the value of information exchanged is
restricted to its use by specific organizations (knowledge specificity) or within a specific time period (time specificity)
(Choudhury et al. 1997). Perceptions of information specificity are conditional upon characteristics of the information to be
shared—i.e. range, quality, privilege, and its degree of coordination-relatedness (Malhotra et al. 2005). For example,
knowledge specificity is expected to be salient when information is high quality, broad, and extensively privileged, while
time specificity is expected to be relevant with respect to information that is coordination related.
Relational Governance

Theories of relational governance build on TCE and add trust as an important dimension of buyer-seller relationships (e.g.
Klein and Rai 2009). For example, interfirm trust has been posited to lower transaction costs and lead to value-creating
behaviors (Dyer and Chu 2003). Notions of uncertainty and information specificity in IOP information sharing suggest that
different levels or forms of trust may influence different types of information sharing. This leads to the following research
question: to what extent do different forms of trust influence information sharing in IOS-enabled IOPs?
Trust in technology, as distinct from trust between IOPs, may also be germane to the study of IT-based information flows
between buyers and suppliers (these are institutional trust and technology trust). Trust in technology is made up of two
distinct constructs (McKnight et al., 2009): (1) institutional trust refers to collectively held beliefs that outcomes will be
successful due to the presence of supportive situations and structures (McKnight et al., 1998). In the context of IOPs, these
include beliefs that information flows are underpinned by appropriate structural safeguards such as contracts, guarantees, and
regulations (McKnight et al. 1998); and (2) trust in a specific technology platform—note: while less established than
institution-based trust, recent studies suggest that people do form trusting beliefs about specific technology attributes—i.e.
consistency, functionality, and helpfulness—that influence technology use, independent of trusting beliefs relating to
individuals or organizations (Lippert 2007; McKnight et al. 2009). The context of IOPs provides an opportunity to
empirically test this claim.
The proposed research model (Figure 1), builds on aspects of Klein and Rai’s (2009) study of strategic information flows
between buyers and suppliers in logistics supply chain relationships. These authors found that trusting beliefs about the
benevolence, integrity, and ability of a receiving partner, positively influenced information sharing with partners. The model
also builds on Malhotra et al.’s (2005) work to propose that the nature of an organization’s trust in its partner will influence
the nature of information shared between partners. To empirically test this proposition, we utilize 3 classes of information
that may be shared among supply chain partners: 1) order; 2) operational; and 3) strategic. We propose that the nature of
information shared will be contingent on different forms of trust and will manifest in perceptions of willingness to share.
Table 1 provides definitions for these and other constructs used in this study. In the next section, we develop hypotheses
based on our research question. Then, we propose an appropriate methodology for testing the research model.
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Figure 1: Research Model

Construct

Defined as

Nature of
information
shared
(Seidmann and
Sundararajan
1997)

The class of private
information shared
between supply chain
partners

Institutional
Trust
(McKnight et
al. 1998)

Beliefs that outcomes
will be successful due to
the presence of
supportive situations and
structures

Trust in a
specific
technology
platform
(based on
McKnight et
al. 2009)

“a willingness to depend
on a specific technology
in a given situation in
which negative
consequences are
possible” (McKnight et
al. 2009, p. 6)

Interfirm trust
(based on Dyer
and Chu 2003;
Lippert 2007)

“one party’s confidence
that the other party in
the exchange
relationship will not
exploit its
vulnerabilities” (Dyer
and Chu 2003, p. 58)

Comprising

Defined as

Order

Transactional exchange information

Operational

Production-related information about resource conditions and
plans

Strategic

Financial and marketing related information

Structural
Assurances

Beliefs that transactions are underpinned by appropriate
structural safeguards such as contracts, guarantees, and
regulations

Trusting
beliefs

Beliefs that the technology platform has the features to
complete a required information sharing transaction
(functionality); will operate consistently (consistency); and
has an adequate and responsive IT support function
(helpfulness)

Reliability

The partner organization will “reliably make good faith efforts
to behave in accordance with prior commitments” (p. 58)

Fairness

The partner organization “makes adjustments in ways
perceived as “fair”” (p. 58)

The partner organization “does not take excessive advantage of
an exchange partner even when the opportunity is available”
(p. 58)
Table 1: Construct Definitions

Goodwill

HYPOTHESES

The nature of information shared in IT-enabled IOPs gives rise to uncertainty and information specificity. Order information,
while private, refers to information contained in routine transactions, such as order quantities and prices (Seidmann and
Sundararajan 1997). The primary focus of this type of information sharing is on reducing order cycle times. Consequently,
uncertainty faced in this type of exchange relates to attributes of the technology platform, rather than to attributes the
exchange partner: for example, whether the technology platform has the necessary attributes for storing and processing order
information in a timely manner. Formally stated:
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H1. Organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share order information will exhibit a high level of technology trust,
while those that exhibit low willingness will not.
Operational information sharing is focused on exploiting expertise across organizational boundaries (Seidmann and
Sundararajan 1997). Information shared is moderate in breadth, moderately privileged and moderately coordination-related
(e.g. inventory level information). In addition to technology concerns, organizations engaged in these types of relationships
must mitigate against the risk of placing interorganizational processes, such as managing inventory, outside of organizational
boundaries. For this reason, we propose that organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share operational information,
will exhibit a high level of institutional trust, while those that exhibit low willingness will not.
H2. Organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share operational information, will exhibit a high level of institutional
trust, while those that exhibit low willingness will not.
In strategic information sharing, information relating to future plans and needs is exchanged, transmitted, and jointly
developed by both the buyer and supplier (Grieger 2003). Knowledge specificity is extremely high because information
exchanged is broad in range, extensively privileged, and of high quality (Malhotra et al. 2005). Knowledge specificity gives
rise to partnership uncertainty over and above features of the technology and institutional structures. Consequently, we expect
that a high level of interfirm trust to be a prerequisite for this type of information sharing. Formally stated:
H3. Organizations that exhibit a high willingness to share strategic information, will exhibit a high level of interfirm trust,
while those that exhibit low willingness will not.
METHOD

Due to practical difficulties in data collection, the majority of prior research is based on data collected from only one party in
the IOP (e.g. Malhotra et al. 2005). A notable exception in the IS literature is Klein and Rai’s (2009) study that utilizes
dyadic data. Klein and Rai’s study provides an exemplar on implementing dyadic research designs. Klein and Rai adopted a
“focal supplier” collection strategy. For this study we propose collecting data from clients (both buyers and suppliers) who
participate in electronic market access forums (EMAFs) that provide a full-range of services covering the classes of
information sharing identified here. Example EMAFs include Ariba, Perfect Commerce, etc.
Because the proposed constructs are perceptual in nature, a survey with valid psychometric properties is expected to be a
suitable data collection method (Malhotra and Grover 1998). Measures for theoretical constructs and controls will be adapted
from existing scales, wherever possible. This means conducting a literature search to generate sample items. The population
of interest is clients (both buyers and suppliers) who participate in an EMAF. Because of the cross-sectional nature of our
data collection, we will not demonstrate causality definitively. The construction of a sample frame from the relevant
population as well as probabilistic sampling methods will support the external validity of our study (Berkowitz 1982). Every
attempt will be made to collect dyadic data. However, because information sharing between buyers and suppliers in these
environments is mediated by the EMAF vendor, the sample should be evaluated for differences between buyers and suppliers
to determine if a dyadic model is appropriate or if, in a mediated environment, it is more appropriate to evaluate EMAF
clients in general (Malhotra and Grover 1998).
Validation of the survey instrument prior to administration is critical both to ensure validity of conclusions as well as to
develop and validate measures of the less well-defined constructs in our study (trust in technology, trust in a supply chain
partner) (Straub et al. 2004). Prior to developing the instrument, we will conduct expert interviews with EMAF clients as
well as EMAF representatives to tighten our operational definitions and to ensure constructs are appropriately translated from
theory to measurement (Malhotra and Grover 1998). Item construction will be conducted to minimize bias and ambiguity,
with additional purification and validation of items provided by pretesting (Podsakoff 2003). Measurement and structural
models will be tested using a components-based approach, such as PLS. PLS is preferred because this is an exploratory,
prediction-oriented, study and PLS maximizes the variance explained in endogenous variables (Teo et al., 2003; Klein and
Rai, 2009). Moreover, it is difficult to achieve large sample sizes with dyadic data (Klein and Rai, 2009). PLS is particularly
suitable for testing relationships with smaller samples. Instrument validity (convergent and discriminant) will be evaluated
through confirmatory factor analysis (Churchill 1979; Kerlinger 2000). Model fit, alternative model testing, and model
solutions will be used to verify the relationships between constructs to test our hypotheses, and to lend support for causal
inferences (Malhotra and Grover, 1998). The procedure for controlling common method variance is not the same in PLS as in
covariance-based SEM. This is because, in PLS, indicators are weighted and summed without partialing variance. In the
absence of a formal method for controlling common method variance in PLS, we will conduct Harman’s single factor test.
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To limit the potential for statistical conclusion error we will target a sample size that provides sufficient power. A rule of
thumb for sample size is 100 or 5 multiplied by the number of variables in the model. To maximize sample size potential
respondents will be contacted on multiple occasions to improve response rates. Non-response bias will be assessed by
comparing early and late responders (Dillman 2009; Malhotra and Grover 1998).
LIMITATIONS

One limitation of the proposed research model is that it does not include partner exchange objectives. Exchange objectives,
as defined by Malhotra et al. (2005) span a continuum between purely efficiency-oriented to efficiency combined with
knowledge creation (Malhotra et al. 2005). Because we anticipate that EMAFs will be motivated by higher profits to move
their clients into higher knowledge creation services, partner exchange objectives may be a relevant construct to incorporate
directly into future research models. In particular, future research can explore how these objectives impact the relationships
between different trust mechanisms and the nature of information shared within the EMAF context. In addition, our
conversations with EMAF providers, suggest that a large proportion of EMAF clients “convert” relationships—i.e. by
moving existing buyer-supplier contracts into the EMAF systems to increase efficiency and to take advantage of other EMAF
value-adding services. This leads us to the intriguing possibility of investigating how the nature of trust and information
shared differs in relationships that originate within the EMAF environment as compared to those that transfer into the EMAF
environment.
CONCLUSION

Assuming the proposed hypotheses are supported, this study will have implications for relational governance research and
practitioners involved in designing and managing EMAF services. First, the development, validation and testing of measures
of interfirm trust, as well as trust in technology, opens up possibilities for future research on buyer-supplier relationships in
EMAF and other IOS-enabled contexts. Second, this study furthers understanding of the contingent role of trust in IOS
adoption and use by revealing what elements of trust are necessary to make optimal use of information exchanged between
organizations. Finally, if these hypotheses are supported, these findings may form the basis for potential design changes to
existing EMAF environments that will encourage the exchange of richer, more privileged, information. Moving a portion of
clients from a predominantly operational efficiency focus towards strategic information exchange could improve EMAF
margins and attract new segments of clients.
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